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THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Alejandro Nadal-
The title of this speech is "The Mexican Economic Recovery." I had
a lot of doubts about bringing my paper to this conference with that
title and on that theme, but I think it is quite germane to your interest
and our debate this morning. For one thing, Gary Hufbauer already has
spent some time on this topic in his presentation.
I will open up with a question that I had, which I will ask in three
parts, is there a recovery of the Mexican economy? Gary said the Mexi-
can economy is recovering. One sign is the financial rescue program
that was put up in early 1995 by the RMF and the U.S. Treasury. The
second sign he mentioned is the flexibility of the Mexican economy. He
thinks this implies that the Mexican economy is recovering.
I happen to think the opposite. I do not think we are recovering. I
think we are sinking deeper into very profound distortions between
sectors, between social groups, and between regions in Mexico. That is
what I am going to be talking about. I think it is very important that
we look at the detailed figures and go into a segregated analysis of
what is going on in the Mexican economy in some key sectors.
As for the relation between the crisis and NAFTA, I think we can
put that question aside. The crisis in Mexico originates in an economic
model that appears flawed; that has problems; that has internal inconsis-
tencies and contradictions. Essentially, you have a basic fundamental
contradiction between internal accounts and internal adjustment in Mexi-
co and the external accounts. You have a contradiction between two
fundamental objectives that you need for an open economy, and that is
what the Mexican economic model is all about.
This model, just to refresh everyone's memory, is based on large-
scale privatization, economic deregulation, trade liberalization, a balanced
budget, and essentially a diminished role for the state. That is the so-
called Washington consensus model. I believe it indicates that Mexico is
simply not working, and we should not be thinking that, if we give it
* Alejandro Nadal is a professor at the Centre for Economic Studies, El Colegio de Mexico,
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more time, this is only a transition and it is eventually going to work.
I am going to be showing three or four tables. Using these tables, I
will try to at least convey the point that there are reasons for concern. I
will be happy by the end of this meeting to say there are reasons for
concern, and there are reasons for doubts. Be careful and let us be more
analytical and detailed in our work regarding the Mexican economy.
There are three basic reasons announced by government officials in
Mexico regarding recovery. People normally say the economy is grow-
ing once again. After the big depression in 1995, when the GDP
dropped by six percent, we had a negative rate of growth of six percent.
In 1996, we already have a positive growth rate of 5.1%. That is the
number one reason for claiming success. The number two reason is that
we are back in the voluntary lending markets of the world. We are back
in the financial scene, and Mexico has been able to repay the U.S.
Treasury and meet its financial obligations.
Number three, inflation is down, and it is continuing in its down-
ward trend. Inflation in 1994 was very low. In fact, in a part of 1994,
we hit a one-digit level for inflation, and that was achieved through
various mechanisms. One of them was the appreciation of the peso,
which, of course, was linked to the crisis; therefore, the success and the
anti-inflation problem was very fragile. When you had to devalue, when
the time of reckoning comes, your 'results on the anti-inflation front
simply evaporate. They disappeared in Mexico. So inflation in 1995
was, let us say, fifty percent. It was slashed down to twenty-one percent
in 1996. One can reasonably expect that it will come down to fifteen
percent in 1997. There are a lot of people who do not believe that. I
think it is going to be in the near twenties. But in any case, between
fifteen and twenty percent is a big change.
Those are three crucial reasons for claiming victory for the adjust-
ment and stabilization program that was launched and implemented by
the government in early 1995.
Very rapidly, I will say this. In spite of the massive adjustment
program launched in early 1995 and implemented ever since, which
implies a monetary policy and massive cuts in government spending that
were already at an all time low in 1993 and 1994, and the contraction
of wages, real wages falling, the main structural problems in the Mexi-
can economy have not been solved. Let us take a look at that. The
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Table III
Mexico: Aggregate Supply and Demand
(constant 1993 pesos)
Values (percentages)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Supply 1497055.1 1602530.5 1456094.5 1619843.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
GDP 1256196.0 1312200.4 1230783.5 1293553.5 83.9 81.9 82.8 79.9
Imports (goods & services) 240859.1 290330.1 255311.0 326287.5 16.1 18.1 172 20.1
Total Demand 1497054.9 1602530.5 1486094.5 1619843.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0"
Private Consumption 903173.5 945070.2 879726.6 899960.3 60.3 59.0 59.2 55.6
Government Consumption 138564.7 142516.7 133391.3 138326.8 9.3 8.9 9.0 8.5
Grass Fixed Capital Formation 233179.4 252745.2 179129.7 210835.7 15.6 15.8 12.1 13.0
Inventory Changes 30597.4 37245.3 -13070.6 -15514.8 2.0 2.3 -0.9 -1.0
Exports (goods & services) 191539.9 224953.1 306917.5 306917.5 12.8 14.0 20.7 18.9
Annual Variation %
1994 1995 1996
Total Supply 7 -7.4 9
GDP 4.5 -6.1 5.1
Imports (goods & services) 20.5 -12.8 27.8
Total Demand 7 -7.4 9
Private Consumption 4.6 -9.5 2.3
Government Consumption 2.9 -1.3 3.7
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 8.4 -29 17.7
Inventory Changes 17.4 33 18.7
Exports (goods & services)
Source: INEGI
If you look at aggregate supply and demand for 1993 to 1996, you
will see that in the bottom part of the chart we have annual variations.
In the column for 1995, you have a negative sign in every item. You
have a huge negative growth rate for imports of more than twelve per-
cent. In 1996, you restore a positive sign to every item. Yet, I would
like to point out three things. First, private consumption was up by
2.3% in 1996. It was a very modest increase. In any case, it would be
premature to say we are doing fine and are on the way to recovery.
Nothing guarantees that, if you fall and you start recovering, you may
not fall again. If you look at the absolute numbers, they are really very
modest. If you look at gross fixed capital formation, again, you have a
growth rate of 3.7% in 1996. If you look at the absolute value figures,
the absolute numbers, we are really talking about something like four
billion dollars, which is a very low figure for a country the size of
Mexico. In any case, you already have the sign here of imports growing
faster than exports. This is a matter of concern.
The conclusion would be that the export sector is growing, though
slowly. Whether it is NAFTA or not, I will not dispute it. Certainly,
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exports have been growing because of NAFTA. If you look at
Maquiladora exports, they have been growing. So in that sense, you
may say NAFrA is somehow helping the Mexican economy. That is not
the entire story, though.
Look at the table of Mexico's external accounts. I said a while ago
that the model is contradictory. It does not allow you to reconcile inter-
nal adjustments with external accounts. If you look at this figure, you
see the trade surplus is going down. Look at the FOB balance, the last
three columns to your right in the chart, in the table. The massive trade
balance we had in 1994, by the way, is another very important item for
people who claim success for the adjustment program, slashing the trade
deficit, the current account deficit. If you look, transforming an eigh-
teen-billion-dollar trade deficit in 1994 into a seven-billion-dollar surplus
is no little thing. It is a very important point. The way you do that is
by contracting your economy. So there is a tremendous cost for the
Mexican economy, for Mexican men and women, from that jump of
minus-eighteen to seven billion in the surplus.
If you look at what went on in 1996, you already see the trade
surplus going down. The forecast for 1997 is that it is going to go
down further. And in addition to that, you have a current account deficit
that is reappearing as something of a matter of concern in 1997. The
forecasts are that we may be stuck with maybe a five-billion-dollar
deficit in the current accounts in Mexico.
Another item of concern here is the total balance of six billion
dollars. Maquiladoras' balance is 5.7 billion dollars. Ninety-five percent
of the surplus is equivalent to Maquiladora surplus. If you take out
maquiladoras from your external accounts, and you look at trade compo-
sition, manufacturing industries are in balance, and you are in trouble.
You are putting all your eggs in one basket for maquiladoras. If you
take maquiladoras and oil out, Mexico has a huge, very important trade
deficit.
By way of background, maquiladoras are industries which are al-
lowed, under certain arrangements in the United States and Mexico, and
certainly now under NAFTA, to import intermediate input and process
them in Mexico and re-export them back to the United States. In other
words, they can import from the United States, process it on the border,
and then export it back to the United States.
So there are reasons there for concern. Right now, I think that
maquiladoras have been overblown and oversold. The real exports are
Mexican, the net exports are Mexican. It is not the 5.7 billion dollars I
just showed you. In Mexico and in the world statistics of trade, we
[Vol. 23:59 1997
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normally take into account the gross value of maquiladoras. I do not
want to go into the technicalities because we would be wasting time
there. But I will say this much. If you look at exports in Mexico, a
significant proportion of exports are based on industries very close to
natural resources. There is nothing bad with that, but be careful. This is,
again, a matter of controversy. The government in Mexico likes to say
that eighty-three percent of Mexican exports are manufacturing exports.
So we are almost an industrialized country. I think Japan is ninety-five
percent, but Germany is not far away with eighty-six percent. I think
there is an accounting exercise there that is totally false and demeaning,
and you have to be careful of those statistics.
The big foreign exports are based on natural resources, like oil, for
example. We are exporting more oil in volume terms than ever before
in the history of Mexico, but, nevertheless, the exports are shrinking.
The other source of competitive advantage is low wages, and that is
where maquiladoras again come in. Finally, again, this holds true for
every country, but in the case of Mexico, it is very, very strong. Your
exchange rate is the other source of competitive advantage.
I do not want to spend too much time now on foreign accounts. I
just want to summarize this part by saying that we are seeing the bal-
ance of payments reappearing as they did in 1992 and 1993, and we
had better brace ourselves, because if nothing is done, we may be back
to where we were in May of 1994.
The budget surplus used to pay interest. Fiscal surplus is basically
sustained by non-tax revenues. Tax revenues are stagnant. For example,
income taxes in 1996 increased by 0.6%. I think that figure speaks for
itself. And the surplus is sustained also by important expenditures. I am
not going out and recommending that we have fiscal deficits. In the past
we did, and certainly in 1992, a crisis was caused by irresponsible
spending. I am not advocating that, but I am saying that we should not
be dogmatic and religious about fiscal balances. I think we share that
distinction with countries like Luxembourg.
Let us go the banking sector, because I think that is very important.
The banking sector of Mexico is, I think, quite pathetic. I think it is fair
to say that we do not have a banking system in Mexico. The most
recent figures that have been published tell you the story. The profits of
all banks are going down. We have losses and no banks. Deposits are
going down or are stagnant. They went down by minus-two percent in
1996. I do not have the figure here, but it is an improvement from what
happened in 1995. Still, you have a negative trend.
All banks have good and bad loans. In Mexico, we have many
restructured loans which were restructured through the government res-
[Vol. 23:59 1997
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cue program for the banks. In other words, these are bad loans that
have been restructured with government assistance and subsidies. If you
take away the bad notes or the bad loans from the good loans, you look
at what I call the viable loans.If you take away the restructured loans
from the good loans, you have the set of loans over here on the viable
loans. And the relevant number is the minus-forty-three percent for the
Mexican banks. This means that the total amount of viable loans in
Mexico's banking system was slashed almost in half between 1995 and
1996. I think that is one of the most disturbing signs about the Mexican
so-called recovery story. We are simply not recovering. The bottom line
is that, were it not for the massive government intervention into the
banking system, which already amounts to twenty billion dollars (seven-
ty-five to eighty percent of which which goes to the bankers, not the
debtors), the banking system would be technically bankrupt.
What does the situation for the future look like? It looks very sad.
The heads of the Bankers' Association in Mexico met in Cancun in late
March. They announced that the restructuring of the banks is going to
last at least another three to four years. There is no credit, and credit
will be forthcoming only for the so-called triple-A companies, big cor-
porations, corporate groups. They can have some access to credit. But,
the future of the Mexican economy still looks dim.
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